Dealing with Eugene Wigner's ideas on the measurement procedure in quantum physics and unearthing the controversy that pitted him against supporters of the interpretation of complementarity, I will show how Wigner and his followers contributed to the defeat of a seemingly unshakeable consensus. In fact, although he intended to defend what seemed to him to be orthodoxy, he himself became a heterodox. I suggest that Wigner's conjectures on the role of consciousness in physical phenomena were not fruitful and were discarded, being today part of the history of physics rather than physics proper. However, his ideas and actions left an indelible mark on the physics of the second half of the 20 th century. Namely, he formulated his ideas in opposition to the "Copenhagen monocracy," which held a stronghold on the interpretation of quantum physics until the late 1960s; he stressed the unsolved status of the measurement problem;
2 is of general interest as this topic involves a contradiction: some contemporary physicists are inclined to deprecate Wigner's insight into the role of the mind in the measurement problem of quantum theory, 1 yet these same individuals read Wigner's work neglecting to take into account the role he played in the context of the 1960s. Judging any historically significant work by contemporary standards constitutes an error of anachronism, and preventing anachronistic narratives of past science may foster collaboration between science and society and counter irrationalism more effectively than distorted images of an idealized science.
The Stage of a New Scientific Theory and its Problematic Foundations
To understand the role Wigner played in the 1960s, one should take into account quantum theory's intellectual and historical context at that time. This theory emerged between 1925 and 1927 as an ensemble of three different mathematical formalisms plus an interpretation of them offered by the Danish physicist Niels Bohr, which was christened the "complementarity view," later known as the "Copenhagen interpretation,"
the "orthodox interpretation," and even the "usual interpretation," besides simply "complementarity." 2 Bohr's interpretation had a philosophical flavor which was unproblematic to physicists such as Pauli, Born, Heisenberg, but it became a hindrance to physicists from, for instance, the American and British milieux. These physicists retained rules of formalism but did not incorporate its philosophy (Heilbron 2001) . It is beyond the scope of the current work to define complementarity, 3 I will, however, demonstrate its relevance to the solution of the measurement problem, which was the central focus of the divergence between Bohr's views and those of John von Neumann 1 Gell-Mann (1994, 155) , wrote: "… many sensible, even brilliant commentators have written about the alleged importance of human consciousness in the measurement process. Is it really so important?" Omnès (2002: 174) , in a recent analysis, tried to put the mind-body thesis into context, but in previous papers he used derogatory phrases to describe such ideas. Baptista (2002: 63-74 ) asked where it was that a serious physicist said consciousness plays a role in measurements. He also wrote that Wigner speculated outside the boundaries of the natural sciences.
and Eugene Wigner. As an exemplar of this philosophical flavor, one may cite the way in which Bohr solved the so-called measurement problem; which is related to the reason why the superposition of quantum states -the quantum identity -did not appear in the macroscopic world of the measurement devices. Bohr suggested that such devices had to be treated within the framework established by classical physics, not because one could not treat them from a quantum point of view, but because they need to be treated classically in order to communicate one's measurement results to other researchers. As communication is a requirement to attain objectivity, and communication requires ordinary language refined by concepts from classical physics (e.g., concepts indicated by classical terms such as "work," "force," etc.), the classical treatment of measurement devices is a condition for preserving objectivity in scientific research. As it happens, Bohr's solution was not accepted by John von Neumann, as we shall see below. He rejected it as a consequence of his own mathematical work, in which, for the first time in the history of physics, he axiomatized quantum theory, identifying Hilbert spaces as the mathematical structure implied in those different mathematical formalisms (von Neumann 1932) . Von Neumann's position received continued support from Wigner.
In the 1930s, complementarity also suffered strong criticisms from Albert Einstein and Erwin Schrödinger. However legitimate those criticisms might have been, at that time they were not seen as such by the vast majority of physicists. Of course, they are now central to the field of research we call foundations of physics. These criticisms were not necessarily shared by those who excluded complementarity from their view of quantum theory, nor did these researchers necessarily foresee their significance. In fact, before World War II, most physicists accepted that Bohr, Heisenberg, Pauli, and others had solved the foundational problems of quantum mechanics, even if they did not consciously share that solution. Max Jammer (1974: 247-251) Omel'ianovskii. The new main challenge to complementarity came from the causal, or "hidden variables" interpretation, suggested by David Bohm, in 1952. In fact, he developed an approach that was able to reproduce known quantum predictions in the nonrelativistic domain, but his approach was embedded in a causal framework, not a probabilistic one in the manner of complementarity. But no matter how interesting the causal interpretation might be, it was not accepted by physicists throughout the 1950s, in such a way that the Copenhagen monocracy was shaken, but not disabled (Freire 1999) .
Enter Wigner
If the causal interpretation presented the greatest challenge to complementarity coming from outside the circle of the founding fathers of quantum mechanics, another major challenge came from within. E.P. (Doncel, Michel & Six 1984) . For the many roles he played in the Manhattan Project, he was consequently awarded the title of "the founder of nuclear engineering" (Weinberg 2002 (Shimony 1997) , and G. Emch, "Annotation", in (Wigner 1995, pp. 1-28 ). Wigner's emphasis on the inability of quantum theory to deal with measurement was not indepent of these early works on the limit of measurability implied by the mathematical formalism of the quantum theory, but I did not discuss this issue in this paper. 6
The second one, discontinuous and erratic, occurs during the measurement processes.
Additionally, but still following von Neumann, he treated measuring devices quantum mechanically, instead of treating them classically as suggested by Bohr. The latter choice leads to the propagation of the singular superposition of quantum states from the system under scrutiny to the ensemble: system plus the measuring apparatuses. In mathematical terms, this propagation is represented by the inner product between the two Hilbert vectors, one related to the system and the other related to the devices. As nobody has ever seen such a bizarre superposition in our macroscopic world, one needs to answer how, where, and when this superposition becomes a vector with just one component.
After all, what we get after measurements is related to vectors and probabilities rather than to superposition of vectors. Wigner emphasized this point and arrived at the next conclusion: in order to eliminate this superposition one needs to admit that measurement leads eventually to the role of the observer's introspection, i.e., when the information enters the mind of the observer.
Conjecturing that mind plays a not eliminable role in the description of quantum measurements was one of Wigner distinctive feature when approaching the measurement problem. According to him (Wigner 1961) , "when the province of physical theory was extended to encompass microscopic phenomena, through the creation of quantum mechanics, the concept of consciousness came to the fore again: it was not possible to formulate the laws of quantum mechanics in a fully consistent way without reference to the consciousness." He presented his arguments following two steps. The first, and less incisive, was that the quantum state changes every time the observer gets new information from observations. While in classical mechanics you also need observation to get the initial conditions and establish the classical state, when you get them and solve the equations of motion, new information is no more relevant to change the state. In the second step, he strengthened his case, presenting an idealized experiment in order to demonstrate the difference between quantum descriptions of measurements with and without human observers. Nowadays the argument related to Wigner's idealized experiment is known as "Wigner's friend" (Wigner 1961 ). Wigner suggests you observe, helped by a friend, an object quantum described by a linear combination of two states.
Your friend observes the object hence, to him it is in one of the two states and no more in a linear combination of the two. Before he tells you the result of the observation, there 7
will be a conflict between your description of the object (linear combination of the two states) and that given by your friend (one of the two states). Since the right quantum description is yours, you must admit that your "friend was in a state of suspended animation before he answered" your question, which is not a reasonable conclusion, and allowed Wigner to arrive to the conclusion that quantum theory is not enough to deal with measurements. So, if quantum theory is to encompass not only inanimate bodies, but also life and mind, it needs to be changed, and Wigner suggested explicitly to look for a non linear equation of motion. 7 In fact, he was suggesting a true research program: to solve the measurement problem, including, from Wigner's point of view, the inclusion of life and mind in the scope of physical theories. shall call the orthodox view." (Wigner 1963 ). Bohr's paper on complementarity is only referred in a footnote. In Wigner's account, therefore, Bohr and complementarity go to the backstage corridor of the quantum story, and Heisenberg and von Neumann become its chief protagonists. I interpret this excerpt as a dispute over the intellectual heritage of the founder fathers of quantum mechanics. It was not by chance that Wigner wrote this text after von Neumann's and Bohr's deaths, and while scientists and historians in the U.S. were involved in one of the largest projects ever to collect and store records significant in the creation and evolution of a scientific theory, which would come to be known as the Archives for the History of Quantum Physics (Kuhn, Heilbron & Forman 1967 ).
Wigner's papers drew both support and opposition. Abner Shimony was very impressed by it: "I found your paper on the mind-body problem extremely stimulating. It is one of the few treatments of the problem which considers the mind-body relationship to be a legitimate subject for scientific investigation, without achieving this scientific status for the problem by reducing it to behavioristic or materialistic considerations." 9 M.
Satosi Watanabe also reacted very favorably to Wigner's suggestion about the role of consciousness in physical processes, and we find in their correspondences a true anticipation of subsequent opposition to Wigner's ideas from Rosenfeld, as well as
Rosenfeld's Marxist motivation to take such a position.
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It was up to Rosenfeld to oppose Wigner in defense of complementarity.
Rosenfeld was Bohr's former assistant since the 1930s, and a physicist very sensitive to epistemological matters. Rosenfeld and Wigner had, however, quite different profiles on a number of issues. Politically, Wigner was very conservative -he was a follower of the Republican Party and was supportive of U.S. foreign policy to the point of receiving a analysis of his broader philosophical views. To a discussion on such issue, see (Esfeld 1999 Bohm, who were themselves critics of complementarity, and physicists like Heisenberg, who leaned towards idealism (Rosenfeld 1953) . So, for a number of reasons -political, ideological, and philosophical -Rosenfeld could not accept a view like Wigner's, which assigned a central role to the mind in physical phenomena.
Wigner and Rosenfeld also displayed significant differences in their approach to the measurement problem. We could also speak of different scientific styles. For
Wigner, following von Neumann, dissecting the mathematical formalism of quantum physics in order to exhibit its axiomatic structure was a necessary step in grasping the theory's full implications. That is not to say that for Wigner axiomatic theories were necessary for all research in physics since in other fields, nuclear physics for instance, his approach was phenomenological. 14 But for Rosenfeld, following Bohr, a phenomenological insight into a physical theory was the best way to understand it, and he always emphasized his distrust of the reach of axiomatic treatment of physical theories.
Even before his dispute with Wigner, he wrote: "the 'axiomatizers' do not realize that every physical theory must necessarily make use of concepts which cannot, in principle, be further analyzed, since they describe the relationship between the physical systems which is the object of study and the means of observation by which we study it: these concepts are those by which we give information about the experimental arrangement, enabling anyone (in principle) to repeat the experiment. It is clear that in the last resort we must here appeal to common experience as a basis for common understanding." Prosperi" (Rosenfeld, 1965) . These Italian physicists had used the ergodic theorem to explain quantum measurements as a thermodynamic amplification of a signal, triggered by the interaction between quantum systems and measurement devices (Daneri, Loinger & Prosperi 1962) . Indeed, the Italian physicists had quantum mechanically treated both the system and the interaction between the system and the measurement device, but, after the interaction ended, they considered the measurement device evolving according classical statistical physics, which was compatible with Bohr's requirement that the measurement devices should be considered classical bodies. It's clear that if Rosenfeld's point of view about the reach of the Italian work were accepted, Wigner's claims would be considered ungrounded. The dispute lasted throughout the second half of the 1960s, and it was marked by bitter arguments, even though it dealt with rather technical content, i.e., to determine whether the Italian work was a rigorous solution or just an approximation. Wigner was specially struck by the next paper of the Italian physicists (Daneri, Loinger, and Prosperi 1966) , in which they criticized Wigner, Shimony,
Moldauer, Yanase, and Jauch's analyses of the measurement problem, and wrote that "none of them gives new substantial contributions to the subject." He wrote to J. M.
Jauch suggesting a reply, and admitting that he was specially irritated not by the attack on him but by its significance for young researchers like Abner Shimony and Michael
Yanase, his ex-students. 16 The letter to Jauch was a typical maneuver for recruiting allies, as Wigner was not in complete accord with Jauch, notwithstanding the fact that the latter was trying to refine von Neumann's mathematical treatment. Jauch did not agree with
Wigner's conjecture on the role of mind in the measurement process and believed that the changes he himself had introduced in von Neumann's treatment had transformed the difference between the two kinds of evolution of the state vector into a pseudo-problem.
Wigner suggested to Jauch that they write a common response, together with Yanase,
Wigner's former student. Looking for allies, Wigner went so far as to suggest that Jauch include in their joint paper a favorable citation of a paper by David Bohm and Jeffrey
Bub. However, Jauch could not accept this last proposal since, in his own work, he was trying to reinforce von Neumann's proof against hidden variables, while Bohm and Bub's work was in line with that last approach. 17 Afterwards, Rosenfeld (1968) as part of physics. He divided them into two items, the first one related to "the philosophical problem," and the second about "questions of physical theory." He explained that the main question at the center of both Prosperi's and of his own concerns was related to the knowledge of the "reason for the statistical, that is probabilistic, nature of the laws of quantum-mechanical theory." In other words, how can one understand that quantum predictions are not "uniquely given by the inputs" even though equations of quantum and classical physics are deterministic? He suggested one might answer this question in different ways, and cleverly framed Prosperi's and his own responses into the same side. This type of answer implies that "the possible reason for the probabilistic nature of quantum theory's conclusions concerning the outcomes of measurements is that the theory cannot completely describe the process of measurement, that some part of the process is not subject to the equations of quantum mechanics." The difference between
Wigner's and Prosperi's views resided in "the area to which quantum mechanics is inapplicable." For Prosperi, probability is necessary for the translation of the quantummechanical description into classical description because this translation is not unique.
To Wigner, as for von Neumann, either quantum mechanics does not "apply to the functioning of the mind" or "the conscious content of the mind is not uniquely given by its state vector." Finally, arguing on more scientific grounds, Wigner remarked that Prosperi and collaborators were using phrases such as "macroscopic variables" and "macroscopic objects" without giving a precise definition of these terms. He remembered examples of phenomena with macroscopic bodies but which exhibit quantum features, such as permanent currents in superconductors and spontaneous magnetization in different directions, besides the observable difference between dextro and levorotatory sugar, which is based on a quantum relation of microscopic phases. In his conclusion, Wigner once more looked for areas of agreement between the two physicists and presented a proposal for a genuine research program. He concluded that since Prosperi's premises could not be rigorously formulated (at least not at that time), and their formulation would entail a significant modification of the theory current at that time, the convergence resided in the conclusion, common to Prosperi and Wigner's views, namely "the inapplicability of quantum mechanics to some part of the measurement process has to be postulated or admitted". happens." (Frisch 1971: 14) . For the first time in the literature, the name "Princeton school" was used to differentiate Wigner's views from the Copenhagen school.
According to Ballentine (1970: 360) Neumann's mathematical proof against "hidden variables" in quantum mechanics, and revealed that quantum formalism leads to the strange physical property of entanglement between systems that are separated in the space-time. 23 Other factors also contributed to change the physicists' attitudes related to the research in foundations of quantum mechanics, but I will not discuss them here (Freire 2003 (Freire & 2004 . What I am saying is that Wigner made a major contribution in this direction, which is not always recognized today.
Wigner's Style of Intellectual Leadership
The portrait of Wigner as just a disputant in the creation of the field of foundations of quantum mechanics is not completely fair to him. He engaged in a variety of activities and assumed a kind of non-dogmatic but highly influential leadership. He formed a group of students to work on the subject, such as Abner Shimony, who held a Ph.D. in Physics with a dissertation on the foundations of statistical mechanics, and
Michael Yanase, a Jesuit priest whose dissertation treated the measurement problem. We have already seen how he mobilized Yanase to join the debate with the Italians. Shimony 
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(1965), but not the paper in which d 'Espagnat (1966) suggested a generalization of Wigner's point of view, according to which "the framework of the orthodox theory of (ideal) measurements" means that these cannot as a rule be described by means of linear quantum mechanical laws. d'Espagnat wrote to Rosenfeld (26 February 1966) our reactions can be deduced from the answers to the questionnaire which you have formulated so cleverly that no evasion is possible. Let me just add that it is quite true that my father strongly emphasized that for an unambiguous description it is essential to include the detection device in the definition of a quantum phenomenon and even advocated that one reserved the word 'phenomenon' for processes that are 'closed' in this sense. However, I do not think he meant this to imply that the act of observation need have any effect on the processes which generated the phenomenon in question." 
Conclusion -Orthodoxy Becomes Heterodoxy
Let us conclude with three remarks: on Wigner's self-awareness of the role he played in the foundations of quantum mechanics; on the success of his ideas and action;
and on a very different question, anachronism in the history of science, which is not strange to the aim of this book. Shimony had the insight to record Wigner's feelings about the attitudinal changes he underwent. These changes may also help us understand changes in the Zeitgeist of physicists of the '60s and '70s with respect to the foundations of quantum mechanics.
Intending to defend what he considered to be the "quantum orthodoxy," he in fact helped to legitimize heterodoxy on this subject, and he himself became a dissenter. In Shimony's (1997: 412) words: "Wigner recognized with some relish a similarity between the 'heterodox' view that quantum mechanics is only approximate in the physical world and the 'orthodox' view that a reduction of the wave packet occurs only when there is a registration upon the consciousness of an observer."
Shimony concluded, citing Wigner: "Both points of view come to the conclusion that the validity of quantum mechanics' linear laws is limited."
During the 1970s, the community working on the foundations of quantum mechanics was mainly occupied with another subject, Bell's inequalities and their experimental tests. Wigner was not as interested in this subject as in measurement problems, but he continued to play an active role until his intellectual vigor began to fade.
However, physicists continued to work on the measurement problem research program and, in the 1980s and 1990s, it matured into the decoherence approach with its first experimental results in 1996. Where Wigner saw a role for the mind in quantum measurements, the contemporary trend looks for an exchange of information between the experimental devices and the environment (Zurek 1991; Haroche 1998) . Today, Wigner's conjecture about the role of the mind in the quantum measurement process is no longer part of physics, but rather part of the history of physics. Nevertheless, the question persists, and from time to time, physicists devote some time to building technical arguments against it (Brandt 2002 Wigner made major contributions in achieving this goal.
Finally, we can conclude that deprecating Wigner's contribution to the foundations of quantum mechanics constitutes an anachronistic reading of those events.
Anachronism does not facilitate our understanding of how science really works because it yields to a distortion of real science. The history of science, as a historical discipline, rectifies anachronistic readings of science because, according to Lucien Febvre (1982) , historians should prevent the sin of all sins -the unforgivable sin, anachronism.
Historians know, however, the tension implied in such prevention, since Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre, the creators of new perspectives to the historical disciplines, advocated that historians should ask questions of the past, and that these questions could be provoked by contemporary questions. This tension is inherent in a discipline on its way to becoming a science, a science still in its infancy, as remarked by Bloch (1997) .
There is further significance in quoting Marc Bloch at the end of this paper, which is included in a book edited by Boaventura de Sousa Santos. There are some parallelisms between Bloch's and Santos's intellectual démarches. In "A Discourse on the Sciences,"
Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2001) took into account what seemed to him to be lessons from the natural sciences in order to reflect on the changing paradigms of social sciences.
Marc Bloch (1997) , in a beautiful but unfinished essay about the historian's craft, written in Nazi prisons sometime before being killed on June 16, 1944, by order of Klaus Barbie, affirmed that our mental environment was not the same anymore. Quantum physics, relativity theory, and the kinetic theory of gases soundly changed the idea we had formed 33 We have an impressive piece of evidence for the low status of research in foundations of quantum physics; just before the Wigner-Rosenfeld dispute, in J.S. Bell's remarks, first published in 1966: "The minority view is as old as quantum mechanics itself, so the new theory may be a long time coming.
[…] We emphasize not only that our view is that of a minority, but also that current interest in such questions is small. The typical physicist feels that they have long been answered, and that he will fully understand just how if ever he can spare twenty minutes to think about it" (Bell, 1966) . I thank Osvaldo Pessoa for bringing this interesting excerpt to my attention.
